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STATE OBLIGATIONS UNDER TREATIES EMBODYING
UNIFIED RULES OF LAW, WITH PARTICULAR
REFERENCE TO THE BUSTAMANTE CODE

ROBERTO LAVALLE*

This study aims to bring out the essential characteristics of State
obligations under treaties' containing unified rules of law and to analyse,
in the light of those characteristics, the relevant provisions of the Havana
Convention on Private International Law of 1928 and of the Code of
Private International Law (known as the Bustamante Code) annexed
2
thereto.
It will not deal, with respect to the treaties in question, with such
matters as their territorial scope, reservations, the difficulties arising
from the diversity of the official languages of the contracting States and
the consequences of the breach of obligations under those treaties. These
r -itters, although germane to the subject, do not pertain to its essence.
A treaty incorporating unified rules of law may provide for their
general application by the authorities of the contracting States. The rules
are thus placed on a par with the majority of purely domestic legal norms
applicable by those authorities. The unification of law on the basis of
treaties applying this method will be referred to as "absolute unification."
The term "relative unification ' 3 will be employed to designate the
method used in treaties that render unified rules mandatory only with
respect to specific situations0 The situations s thus specified normally
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involve, except for one category of treaties embodying unified conflict
rules, 6 relationships that, by reason of the persons, things or places involved,
are, in the abstract, of concern to at least any two of the contracting8
States. 7 They will henceforth be referred to as "transnational situations".
In practise, relative unification is the rule, absolute unification the exception .9
...There exist treaties for the absolute unification of law that do not
prescribe or anticipate, expressly or by implication, that the unified rules
they contain are to be incorporated into the legislation of the contracting
States.10 Such treaties may be regarded as self-executing in a contracting
State, that is, as susceptible of application by the judicial or administrative
organs of that State in the absence of implementing legislation, if its
constitutional law does not require legislative action for the implementation
of such treaties. But the majority of treaties for the absolute unification
of law cannot qualify as self-executing instruments inasmuch as they
prescribe or anticipate the incorporation into national legislation of the
unified rules they embody."
- It'is interesting to observe that, in the absence of commitments under
treaties providing for unified rules of conflicts in a given area of private
law, States parties to a treaty for the absolute unification of substantive
private law in that, area are,. to an extent left undetermined by the treaty,
freeto replace, pursuant to their domestic conflict rules, the unified rules
of the treaty by the laws of States not parties thereto (or by special laws
prevailing in 'territories under the jurisdiction of contracting States but
outside. the territorial scope of the treaty) :12 In order to :eliminate this
iar-gin of'uncertainty, a treaty aiming at the absolute unification of a
branch'! of- substantive- private law must. either commit the contracting
States.to'the adoption of unified rules of conflicts in the'area concerned
or.,
be accompanied by another treaty: so committing, them. The usefulness
of.this dual approach was recognized in 1930 and 1931 with respect to
the unification of substantive rules regarding bills of exchange, promissory notes and checks, for each of the two substantive conventions1 3 is
matched by a treatY.y unifying the. core-sponding conflict, rules.' 4
Treatiesproviding for relative Unification of law are asa rule drafted
in such a way as to be self-executing.'I Their areas of application, that
i,
ranepf transnational situations with respect to which the unified
rules they contain are mandatory, can be defined positively or negatively.
-T reaties providing for relative unification which define their area
of 'applicatibri posifively lay down 'thati the unified rules they incorporate
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are mandatory with respect to specified transnational situations, thus
rendering optional their application to any other situation falling within
their terms. This method is used in the Warsaw Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules regarding Air Transport of 1929, as amended
by the Protocol done at The Hague on 28 September 1955."6 Article I
of the former, as amended, defines the concept of international carriage,
which constitutes the transnational situation with respect to which this
convention binds the contracting parties.
Treaties for the relative unification of law that define their area of
application in a negative way provide that the parties shall enforce unified
rules except in respect of certain situations, which are excluded altogether from the ambit of the treaty concerned. This means that States do
not need to make reservations in order to assert their right not to apply
the unified rules with regard to these situations. Thus, the Geneva Convention for the Settlement of Certain Conflicts of Laws in Connection with
Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes of 1930 provides, in Art. 1,
that "the High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to apply . . . the
rules set out in the following articles," but also lays down, in Art. 10, that
each party reserves to itself the right not to apply those rules (1) with
respect to obligations undertaken outside the territory of one of the
contracting parties and (2) whenever by virtue of the application of such
rules a situation would be governed by a law that is not in force in the
17
territory of a contracting party.
Each of the treaties individually considered thus far is characterized
by the fact that the contracting States assume the same obligations with
respect to every one of the corresponding unified rules. However, a
treaty containing unified rules of law may impose upon the contracting
States obligations that vary according to the set of rules or the individual
rule concerned.
A provision of such a treaty may in fact weld the enunciation of a
unified rule of law and the definition of the obligation assumed by the
contracting States regarding that rule into a self-contained whole. Thus,
Art. 1 of a Convention adopted by the Nordic countries in 1933, in providing that "a declaration of bankruptcy in any of the contracting States
shall also apply to the bankrupt's property in the territory of the other
States,"" s combines into a coherent aggregate a unified rule of law (that
declarations of bankruptcy abroad are to apply to property situated in
the national territory) and the obligation undertaken by the contracting
States in relation to that rule (to apply. it in respect of declarations of
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bankruptcy made in any other contracting State.) Further illustration is
offered by Art. 5 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, as revised at Brussels on 26 June 1948,19 under which
"authors who are nationals of one of the countries of the Union, and who
first publish their works in another country of the Union, shall have in
the latter country the same rights as native authors."
Provisions of treaties for the unification of law that thus amalgamate
international
a unified rule and the corresponding obligation under public
'20
law will henceforth be called "self-sufficient provisions.
While in theory it is not inconceivable that self-sufficient provisions
may operate by way of absolute unification, in practise they normally
constitute instances of relative unification.
Most treaties embodying unified
sufficient precision the obligations they
Of those that do not do so, one of the
on Private International Law adopted

rules of law lay down with fairly
impose upon the contracting States.
most noteworthy is the Convention
in Havana in 1928.21

Art. 1 of this Convention provides: "The contracting Republics accept and put into force the Code of Private International Law annexed to
the present Convention." This clause seems to imply that the contracting
States undertook to apply the unified rules of the Code on the basis of
absolute unification. But further enquiry shows that this was not the
case.
Art. 2 of the Havana Convention lays down that "the provisions of
this Code shall be applicable only among the contracting Republics and
among the other States which adhere to it in the manner hereinafter provided."
Except for certain provisions of the Code that are or can be regarded as self sufficient, 22 neither the Convention nor the Code contains
any rules other than the two articles of the Convention just cited that
directly determine or refer to obligations assumed by the contracting
States.
Art. 2 of the Havana Convention is unobjectionable, although altogether superfluous, with regard to the self-sufficient provisions of the
Code. It is, however, an incongruity with respect to the provisions of the
Code that are not self-sufficient, that is, with respect to almost all the
rules of conflicts contained therein. 3 Relations between States parties to
the Havana Convention, like relations between States in general, are gov-
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erned, in the overwhelming majority of cases, solely by rules of general
or particular public international law, whereas those provisions of the
Code have no other import than to determine the national substantive
legal systems that are to govern the situations of a private law character
to which these provisions refer. It is by and large incongruous, for example, to provide that a State shall, in its relations with another State,
apply the rule laid down in Art. 261 of the Bustamante Code, according
to which "the contract of fire insurance is governed by the law of the
place where the thing insured is located at the time of its execution."
It will not do to say, in defense of the Havana Convention, that
treaties may confer rights and lay obligations upon individuals. No
individual can claim a right or be liable to an obligation under a treaty
if the latter neither determines the individuals to which its norms are
addressed nor lays down that those norms apply to individuals finding
themselves in situations defined in the treaty; and Art. 2 of the Havana
Convention does neither the one nor the other, for it speaks only of relations between States.
The delegate of the United States at the Second Meeting of the
24
that the
Inter-American Council of Jurists put on record his opinion
conflict rules of the Bustamante Code are binding upon States parties to
the Havana Convention only with respect to situations where compliance
therewith results in the application of the law of one of those States. Although based on a misconception, the idea that conflict rules concern
relations between the States whose laws and courts are involved has found
25
The interfavor with some specialists of private international law.
accordingly
might
thus
advocated
Convention
Havana
of
the
pretation
be based on the assumption that the drafters had this idea in mind. The
more so since the modality in question has been adopted in several
26
treaties providing for unified conflict rules.
The assumption is ruled out, however, by an examination of the history of the Havana Convention. The Report on the Codification of Private International Law that Eduardo Espinola submitted on 25 January
1928 to the Third Commission of the Sixth International Conference of
American States, at which the Havana Convention was adopted, contains
the following passage: "It should be noted, in the first place, that in accordance with Art. 2 of the Draft Convention, the Code is to govern
only juridical relations between nationals of the contracting States and
' 27
As the Draft Convention was
of States adhering to the Convention."
adopted without change first by the Third Commission and then by the
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Conference in plenary, it can probably be concluded that the delegates
understood Art. 2 of the Convention to mean that the unified rules of the
Code that are not self-sufficient were to apply only to relations between
nationals of the contracting or 'adhering States. Thus, the Convention
presumably aimed, with respect to those rules, only at relative unification
on that basis.
It should be noted, however, that recourse to the history of the
Havana Convention in interpreting Art. 2 thereof does not solve all the
problems that may arise in practice.
The law of Guatemala provides a means of illustrating such! practical problems. Guatemalan statutes enacted after Guatemala's ratification
of the Havana Convention contain conflict of laws provisions that, are
irreconcilable with some rules of the Bustamante Code. The question
therefore arises in which cases of a private law nature pending before a
Guatemalan court that can he resolved by applying those provisions should
the court apply the Bustamante Code rules inpreference to them and vice
versa. In other words, what principles should guide a Guatemalan court
in resolving possible conflicts between Bustamante Code rules and purely
statutory conflict of laws provisions?
A case in point is a rule contained in a Guatemalan statute of 1968
under which contracts are to be governed, with respect to their nature,
validity, performance, effects and any other matters relating to them,
by the law of the place where they are to be executed.28 This rule is in
conflict with Art. 186 of the Bustamante Code, which lays down, as a
rule applicable to contracts in general, that "the personal law common
to the contracting parties shall be first applied, and in the absence of
such law there shall be applied that of the place where the contract was
concluded." A Guatemalan court faced with such a conflict between a
Bustamante Code rule and a purely domestic statutory provision will be
required, given the legislative history of Art. 2 of the Havana Convention,
to give preference to the Bustamante Code rule whenever the litigants
are nationals of two or more States parties to the Convention (including
Guatemala). However, this criterion will not suffice if only some of the
29
litigants are nationals of States bound by the Havana Convention, if
one of the litigants is at the same time a national of a State bound by
the Convention and of a State not bound by it, or if one or more of the
parties to the lawsuit have changed their nationalities after the date -on
which the private law relationship giving rise to the case was created but
before judgment is rendered. In all such situations there will be serious
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uncertainty as to which of the divergent provisions, the Bustamante Code
rule or the purely domestic rule, should prevail.
As has been noted, the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to
Maintenance Obligations towards Children of 1956 and earlier treaties
containing unified conflict rules expressly render those rules mandatory
whenever compliance therewith leads to the application of the law of one
of the contracting States.30 The comments made on the Havana Convention of 1928 and the Code annexed thereto make clear the superiority of
this system over that adopted by the Havana Convention for defining the
obligations of the States it binds.
The author hopes therefore that, if the revision of the Havana Convention and its Code of Private International law is not carried through
by way of what he has termed "absolute unification", the formula embodied in the last-mentioned Hague Convention or some other equally
rational technique will be applied, on the basis of explicit provisions, in
preference to the dubious and faulty system adopted in 1928 to define the
1
obligations of States parties to the Havana Convention?

NOTES
t

While, in the nature of things, only treaties concluded by States are of concern
here, attention is drawn to the bizarre provision contained in Art. 6 of the Convention on Private International Law signed at Havana in 1928, which entitles "international juristic persons" other than States to accede to the Convention. No such
entity has availed itself of this possibility. For a reference to publications containing
the text of the Convention, to which the Code of private international law known
as the Bustamante Code is annexed, see the following foot-note.
2
For the text of the Convention and the Code, see 86 L.N.T.S. 246 or 4 Hudson,
International Legislation, 2279.
1
To avoid possible confusion, it may be useful to point out that the adjectives
absolute and relative can be predicated on the unification of law to convey ideas
differing entirely from what these adjectives are intended to mean in the text:
unification can be regarded as absolute whenever unified rules are interpreted and
applied in exactly the same way by all the courts and other authorities of the
contracting States, as relative whenever they are not.
4

For a searching analysis of the various aspects of what is here called relative
unification, see Lemhofer, B., "Die Besohrankung der Rechtvereinheitlichung auf
Internationale Sachverhalte," Rabels Zeitschrift fur Auslandisches und Internationales
Privatrecht,. 1960, pp. 401-455. In a yearbook of the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law, A. Malintoppi ably contrasts relative and absolute unification. (but without using those terms), employing the expression "r~gle d'application"
to designate the norm by virtue of -which contracting States are bound to apply the
unified rules in respect of certain situations. (See Malintoppi, A., "Les relations
entre l'unification et l'harmonisation du droit et la technique de 'unification ou de
l'harmonisation par la voie d'accords internationaux", Yearbook 1967-1968 of the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Rome, Editions "Uni-
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droit" 1969, Volume II, pp. 43-76.) In his study on comparative law, H. C. Cutteridge uses the adjectives entire and partial to draw the distinction between absolute
and relative unification, respectively. (See, Gutteridge, H. C., "Comparative Law,
an Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal Study and Research", second
edition, Cambridge, at the University Press, 1949, p. 154.) See also David, R., "The
Unification of Private Law", in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law,
Vol. II, Chapter 5, New York, Oceana Publications, Inc., 1971, pp. 46-48.
5
Care should be taken to avoid confusion with respect to the situations in
question. Like any other legal norms, unified rules of law embodied in a treaty
describe the situations in which they are applicable or that they regulate. These
situations are distinct from those mentioned in the text in that they are part and
parcel of the unified rules, that is, of norms designed to apply in the realm of
municipal law. The situations referred to in the text are, on the other hand, constituent elements of obligations laid upon States by treaties, that is, of norms of
public international law. (Cf. footnote 8.) (It may be noted, however, that in the
treaties which are the subject of footnotes 6 and 26 a linkage exists between the
norms of international law held down in those treaties and the unified rules embodied therein.)
6
The essential characteristic of treaties in this category is a provision under
which the unified conflict rules they embody are mandatory only if compliance with
those rules results in the application of the law of one of the contracting States.
(For a list of the treaties of this type that are known to the author and comments
on their interpretation see footnote 26.) The situations in which the application of
the unified conflict rules contained in these treaties is mandatory for the contracting
States are thus sui geners. (They are unusual in that they contain no reference to
persons, things or places and in that they are linked to the corresponding unified
rules.)
7

See Lemhofer, op. cit., in particular at pp. 413-416 and 443-447. There exist
treaties for the relative unification of law that define the situations in which the
unified rules they contain are mandatory in such a way that, taken literally, the
definitions include, by reason of the generality of their terms, the following situations (referred to henceforth as "anomalous situations"); (a) situations of concern
to only one contracting State and (b) situations of concern only to a contracting
State and to a State (or States) not bound by the treaty in question. This is illustrated by the International Convention for the Unification of certain Rules relating
to Bills of Lading adopted at Brussels in 1924 (text in 120 L. N. T. S. 155 and 2
Hudson, International Legislation, 1344). On a literal interpretation, Art. 10 of
this treaty, which provides that the unified rules of the Convention apply "to bills
of lading issued in any of the Contracting States", requires the courts of a State
party to the Convention to apply those rules in certain anomalous situations. (This
provision, in its literal meaning, covers all bills of lading issued in the territory of
a contracting State, even when they are elements of purely domestic situations or of
situations concerning only one State-or States-not bound by the Convention.) In
the author's opinion, the fact that anomalous situations come within the literal meaning of provisions such as Art. 10 of the Brussels Convention, rather than being viewed
as evidence of the drafters' intention to cover anomalous situations, should be ascribed,
prima facie, to a lack of precision on their part. It follows that such provisions,
notwithstanding their literal import, should be interpreted, in the absence of indications to the contrary in the "travaux pr~paratoires", as covering exclusively situations
of concern to at least two contracting States. (See Lembofer's comments on the
Brussels Convention of 1924 in Lemhofer, op. cft., p. 431 and pp. 452453, and, for a
provision along the lines of Art. 10 of the Brussels Convention that explicitly limits
relative unification to situations of concern to at least two contracting states, Art. XI
of the Convention on the International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft, done at
Geneva in 1948 and published in 310 U.N.T.S. 151.)
An example of the rare cases where a treaty for the relative unification of law
specifically provides for the mandatory application of unified rules in certain ann-

STATE

OBLIGATIONS AND

UNIFICATION OF LAW

malous situations is provided by the Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the
International Sale of Goods (see article 1 of the Uniform Law annexed thereto),
done at The Hague in 1964 and published in Register of Texts and other Instruments concerning International Trade Law, Volume I (hereafter cited as "Register"), United Nations Publications, Sales No. E.71.V.3, pp. 39-63, and Sources of
International Uniform Law (hereafter cited as "Sources"), edited by K. Zweigert and
J. Kopholler, Leiden, A. W. Sithjoff, Volume I, pp. 41-59.
8A provision in a treaty for the relative unification of law that is formulated in
terms of a treaty commitment but does not contemplate transnational situations
is no more than an element of the unified rules of the treaty. Thus, Art. I (not.
withstanding the terms of the first sentence) and Art. 5 of the Convention on the
Law Applicable to International Sales of Goods are, despite their being formulated
in terms of obligations laid upon the contracting States, no more than integral parts
of the unified rules of the Convention, the reason being that the situations contemplated in those provisions are not transnational situations proper. (For the text
of the Convention, which by definition cannot provide for transnational situations
inasmuch as it prescribes absolute unification, see 510 U.N.T.S. 149 or Register,
op. cit., pp. 5-8). Conversely, a treaty containing unified rules of law may incorporate the definition of the relevant transnational situations with the unified rules.
Thus, Art. I of the Uniform Law annexed to the Convention relating to a Uniform
Law on the International Sale of Goods contains the definition of the transnational
situations in which the Convention is binding, despite the fact that it is formally
a part of the unified rules of the Convention. (For an indication of publications
containing the text of the latter, see footnote 7, last sentence.)
9

See the table appended to Lemhofer's study in Lemhofer, op. cit., pp. 449-455.

10An example is provided by the Convention on the Establishment of the Maternal
Filiation of Children Born out of Wedlock. (Cf. Art. 8 of the French and German
versions of this treaty, the text of which is published in Sources, op. cit., vol. 1, pp.
20-21, 373-374 and 695-696.) It may be noted that a treaty merely recording the
agreement of the contracting States on the unified rules incorporated therein without
referring to the application of those rules by the authorities of those States would
offend against logic. For, while a unified rule can be the object of the obligation of a
State under a treaty, it cannot in itself constitute such an obligation. Moreover, such
a treaty would leave room for doubt as to whether absolute or only some measure
of relative unification was intended. (See the remarks in footnote 21 regarding the
Montevideo Treaties of 1889 and 1939-1940 for the unification of private law.)
ttSee, for example, Art. I, paragraph one, of the Geneva Convention providing
a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes of 1930, under which
"the High Contracting Parties undertake to introduce in their own languages, the
Uniform Law forming Annex I of the present Convention". (Text in 143 L.N.T.S. 257
and Register, op. cit., pp. 154-180.) Art. I of the Geneva Convention of 1931
providing a Uniform Law for Cheques contains an identical provision. (Text in 143
L.N.T.S. 355 and Register, op. cit., pp. 192-213.) For an example of a similar commitment to absolute unification in a treaty embodying unified conflict rules, see Art. 7
of the Convention on the Law applicable to International Sales of Goods. (Text in
510 U.N.T.S. 147 and Register, op. cit., pp. 5-8.) For a less explicit formulation, see
article I (1) of the Convention on the Liability of Hotel-Keepers concerning the
Property of their Guests (text in 590 U.N.T.S. 81 and Sources, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp.
217-219).
t2
See Lembofer, op. cit., pp. 413-414.
tt
4

See footnote 11.

1 Convention for the Settlement of Certain Conflicts of Laws in connexion with
Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, Geneva, 7 June 1930, and Convention for
the Settlement of Certain Conflicts of Laws in connexion with Cheques, Geneva,
19 March 1931. Texts in 143 L.N.T.S. 317 and 143 L.N.T.S. 407, and in Register,
op. cit., pp. 181-185 and 214-219, respectively.
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:tIAn example of a treaty for the relative unification of law that is not selfexecuting is offered by the Convention to a Uniform Law on the International Sale
of Goods done at The Hague in 1964, under article I of which "each Contracting
State undertakes to incorporate into its own legislation . . . the Uniform Law on the
International Sale of Goods . . . forming the Annex to the present Convention".
(For a reference to publications containing the text of this treaty as well as comments
on other peculiarities thereof, see footnotes 7 and 8.)
S,16Cf. also Art. 2 of the Convention, as amended by article II of the Protocol,

and article XVIII of the latter. (For the text of the Convention, see 137 L.N.T.S. 11
or 5 Hudson, International Legislation 100; for that of the Protocol, 478 U.N.T.S.
371.)
17Same provisions in Art. 9 of the Convention for the Settlement of Certain
Conflicts of Laws in connection with Cheques of 1931. (See footnote 14.)
18Convention between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden regarding
Bankruptcy, signed at Copenhagen, November 7th, 1933. Text in 155 L.N.T.S. 133.
t9
Text in 331 U.N.T.S. 217. See also Art. II of the Universal Copyright Convention of 1952 (216 U.N.T.S. 132).
20Although self-sufficient provisions often refer to the activities of government
agencies, it should be noted that by doing so a unified rule does not ipso facto constitute a self-sufficient provision. Art. 62 of the Montevideo Treaty on International
Civil Law of 1940 (see the following footnote) is a case in point. This provision, in
laying down that "the judges of the social domicile are competent to take cognizance
of actions between partners which relate to the partnership" refers to the behavior
of government agencies, but is clearly not self-sufficient. (The question as to what
partnerships the rule applies to is left unanswered.)

21See footnote 2. It may likewise be noted that the Treaties adopted at the First
and the Second South American Congress on Private International Law held in
Montevideo in 1889 and 1939-1940, respectively, are also deficient. Some of these
treaties are unusual in refraining totally or partially from laying down obligations
that the contracting States. agree to assume with regard to the unified rules they
contain. For, after the introductory. clause to the effect that the parties agree to the
contents of the body of the treaty, one finds an enunciation of the unified rules in
which some of these are not coupled with a definition, express or implied, of the
obligations undertaken by the contracting States with regard thereto, this enunciation
being followed only by the final clauses. It is therefore debatable whether the parties intended to adopt the unified rules thus left in a vacuum by way of absolute or
of merely relative unification; and, if the conclusion is reached that only relative
unification was sought, it is impossible to ascertain, except by resort to the "travaux
priparatoires", the situations in respect of which the unified rules were intended to
be- binding. To illustrate the point made, attention is drawn to the Treaty on International Commercial Terrestrial Law of 1940 (8 Hudson, International Legislation,
498) and to the Treaty on International Civil Law of the same year (8 Hudson,
International Legislation, 513). The obligations assumed by States parties to these
two treaties are undetermined, except for a few provisions that might he regarded as
self-sufficient (Art. 9, 42, 43-53 of the former instrument and 3 and 26, paragraph 1,
of the latter). (For the texts of the nine instruments adopted in 1889, see Martens,
Nouveau recueil g~ndral de trait~s, deuxilme sirie, tome XVIII, pp. 414-457; the nine
instruments signed in 1939-1940 are reproduced in 8 Hudson, International Legislation, 404-421 and 460-532.)
22These rules are contained in Art. 1, 2, 8, 31, 40, 56, 100, 104, 114, paragraph 2,
137, 174, 237, 252, 278, 297-308, 310, 311, 315, 318, 326, 333-339, 342, 344-396, 402,
408, 410-418, 419 (partly) and 421-437.
23The height of incongruity is reached in the non-self-sufficient provisions of the
Bustamante Code dealing with relations. between spouses, 'other aspects of family
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law, wills and various other matters that can only concern individuals (Art. 24, 27-30,
36-39, 41-55, 57-99, 101, 102, 144-151, 187-193 and 234-236).
241952-1954 Inter-American Juridical Yearbook, 299, 300.
25Cf. Weiss, A. "Manuel de droit international privd", Paris, Librairie de la
Soci6t6 du recueil g6niral des lois et des arrts, 1905, p. xxv, and Alfonsin, Q.,
"Curso de derecho privado internacional con especial referencia a] derecho uruguayo
y a los Tratados de Montevideo de 1889, Teoria del derecho privado internacional",
Montevideo, Biblioteca de Publicaciones Oficiales de la Facultad de Derecho y
Ciencias Sociales de In Universidad de Montevideo, Section III, LXXVI, pp. 19 and
43.
26
Art. 6 of the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations towards Children of 1956 provides: "The Convention shall apply only to
cases where the law indicated in Art. I is that of one of the Contracting States"
(text in 510 U.N.T.S. 161). Cf. also the Hague Convention to regulate the conflict
of laws in regard to Marriage of 1902 (Martens, Nouveau recueil g6n6ral de trait6s,
deuxihme srie, volume 31, pp. 706-715), paragraph 2 of Art. 8, the Hague Convention
to regulate the conflict of laws and jurisdiction in regard to Divorce and Separation
of 1902 (ibid., pp. 715-724), paragraph 2 of Art. 9, the Hague Convention concerning
the conflict of laws relating to the effects of Marriage on the rights and duties of
the spouses in their personal relations and on the property of the spouses of 1905
(Martens, Nouveau recueil gdnral de trait6s, troisi me sfrie, volume 6, pp. 480-489),
Art. 10, as well as the Geneva Convention for the Settlement of Certain Conflicts of
Laws in Connection with Bills of Exchange and Promissory. Notes of 1930 and the
Geneva Convention for the Settlement of Certain Conflicts of Laws in Connection
with Cheques of 1931. Art. 10 (2) and 9 (2), respectively. (For a reference to publications containing the texts of the two latter conventions, see footnote 14.)
With respect to the treaties cited above, it is important to guard against one
possible error. If the provision to the effect that the unified rules contained therein
are mandatory whenever compliance with those rules results in the application of the
law of one of the contracting States is interpreted literally by a court of one of those
States, that court would apply those conflict rules in any case where such compliance
results in the application of the hex Joi. This would seem to be wrong inasmuch
as at first glance the case appears to involve an "anomalous situation" as defined
in footnote 7. But this impression is erroneous. For the fact that in delivering a
judgment a court of a contracting State has applied the lex lori pursuant to the
provision in question means that if the case had been brought before the courts of
any other of the contracting States the same law would have been applied, so that
such literal interpretation of the provision ensures the application to the case of the
same law by the courts of all the contracting States, which is precisely the fundamental aim of the treaty concerned.
27
See Sanchez de Bustamante y Sirvin, A., "Le Code de droit international p'iv6
et Ia Sixi~me conffrence pan-am6ricaine", Paris, Librairie du Recucil Sirey, 1929,
p. 126. It should be noted, however, that this interpretation is not in harmony with
most of the self-sufficient provisions of the Bustamante Code (enumerated in footnote
22). For the majority of those provisions apply to all persons within their purview,
regardless of nationality or country of residence.
28

"Decreto del Congreso No. 1762, Ley del Organismo Judicial", Art. 18. (See
"El Guatemalteco, Diario Oficial de Ia Rep6blica de Guatemala, Nfimero 14", of
July 26, 1968, first page.)
29For example a creditor who is a national of one of these States sues several
co-debtors only some of whom are nationals of States bound by the Convention.
3

0See footnote 26.

31For an account of the protspects for a revision of the Bustamante Code, see
Nadelmann, K. H., 'The Need for Revision of the Bustamante Code", 65 A.J.I.L.,
a
pp. 782-793.

